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Mexico and Argentina in the 1990s as well as Weimar Germany in the 1920s 
implemented similar exchange-rate-based stabilization programs which were 
successful in stopping inflation, but failed to generate the domestic savings and 
investment rates necessary for a sustainable growth path.  It is argued that in both 
cases substantial foreign capital inflows were attracted by a stable nominal exchange 
rate and high interest rates, which alleviated the distributional struggle driving high 
inflation.  However, this incentive structure caused a profit squeeze in the tradable 
goods sector due to an appreciating real exchange rate precipitating the ultimate 
collapse of the programs. 
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1. Introduction: Lessons from the present for the past 
The demise of Keynesian economic policies in the 1970s did not only change 
interpretations of the decade’s economic crisis, it also lead to a re-evaluation of perceived 
thinking about one of the crucial turning points in German history: the economic collapse of 
the Weimar Republic.  During the reign of the Keynesian paradigm the conventional wisdom 
held that Reichskanzler Brüning’s deflationary policies in the early thirties had caused the 
devastating nature of the depression.  The severity of the German Depression, it was argued, 
could have been avoided by implementing counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies of the 
type that were believed to have been so successful in the postwar period.
1 
In the late 1970s the prevailing viewpoint was questioned by Knut Borchardt, one of 
Germany’s most prolific economic historians.  First, Borchardt (1991) put forth the argument 
that the Weimar economy was already crippled and on an unsustainable path due to 
unresolvable distributional conflict.  According to this view, real wage growth surpassed 
productivity growth during the latter half of the 1920s.  The resulting profit squeeze 
depressed investment rates and led to stagnation.  Second, Brüning’s options during the early 
1930s were severely constrained by several internal and external economic and political 
factors, including the contradictions of the 1920s growth strategy, making the adoption of an 
expansionary policy impossible.  These initial revisionist statements have sparked a vehement 
response and ongoing discussion which has come to be known as the Borchardt debate (von 
Kruedener, 1989). 
Focusing on the first of Borchardt’s claims, the “crisis before the crisis” argument, the 
paper contributes to this debate by utilizing an analysis of the recent Latin American 
economic problems after implementing exchange-rate-based stabilization programs to shed 
new light on the German interwar economy.  The discussion presented in this paper therefore 
follows in Borchardt’s footsteps who stated that “it is not the case that one can only learn  2 
lessons from the past for the present—one also learns lessons from the present for the past” 
(Borchardt, 1991, p. 144).  Borchardt’s criticism was inspired by 1970s attacks on 
Keynesianism which according to the Rational Expectations school and their New Classical 
followers was neither able to explain nor provide policy solutions for the decade’s experience 
with stagflation.  In contrast, this paper will argue that the analysis of the consequences of 
exchange-rate-based stabilization (ERBS) programs presents a compelling alternative 
perspective on the issues raised in the debate.  In a number of developing countries, especially 
in Latin America, these programs have been hailed for their success in reducing inflation but 
have most recently been questioned because of their association with stagnation and crises.  
The growing literature on the contradictions of ERBS programs thus addresses economic 
problems also raised by Borchardt for the Weimar case. 
Latin America during the early 1990s as well as Weimar Germany after 1923 were 
characterized by successful inflation stabilization attempts in the context of relatively open 
trade and financial markets.  In both cases macroeconomic stability, a liberal market 
environment and liquid international financial markets led to substantial capital inflows. Yet 
low inflation, liberalized markets and the availability of foreign capital did not promote the 
domestic savings and investment rates necessary for a sustainable growth path.  In fact, ERBS 
programs often end in crisis.  Mexico suffered a severe financial and economic crisis after 
abandoning its currency peg in late 1994.  Brazil had much the same problems after letting 
the Real float in early 1999.  Argentina although still clinging to its currency board is fighting 
a prolonged recession with high unemployment in 2001.  The country also has to cope with 
international debt levels that many observers believe to eventually lead to a default and the 
collapse of the currency board.  Many economists therefore have raised the question whether 
the stabilization programs “sow the seeds of their own destruction” (Végh and Reinhart,  3 
1996).  Similarly, the question posed here is whether the successful end to hyperinflation in 
Germany caused the “crisis before the crisis.” 
It will be argued that, now and then, inflation stabilization measures based on the 
exchange rate anchor in the presence of liberal trade and capital accounts create an incentive 
system leading to destabilizing economic dynamics.  The inflow of foreign capital is essential 
for sustaining stabilization success because it alleviates distributional struggles that caused 
inflation in the first place.  However, the incentive structure to attract foreign funds after high 
inflation periods consists of stable nominal exchange rates and high interest rates.  These 
conditions tend to create an overvalued exchange rate that will discourage the allocation of 
resources to the tradables sector, the “engine” for sustainable growth.  Countries face a 
dilemma because they need foreign capital to stabilize their price levels but the conditions for 
securing foreign help create stagnation. 
The argument will be presented in the following steps.  First, a comparison of the 
inflation stabilization programs will be presented in order to establish the similarities between 
the German and the Latin American cases.  Second, the conditions for sustainable growth 
after stabilization will be compared to stylized patterns of recent ERBS program results 
followed by a structuralist interpretation of these patterns.  Third, I will present a more 
detailed narrative of the contradictions of the Weimar economy in the 1920s.  The final 
section applies the results to re-evaluate the Borchardt debate in light of the recent 
developments in Mexico and Argentina. 
 
2. External shocks, hyperinflation and stabilization: Weimar Germany and Latin America 
compared 
The purpose of this section is to establish the similarities between the trajectory of 
Mexico and Argentina since the mid-1980s and that of Weimar Germany focusing on the  4 
causes of inflation and the policies that were implemented to stop it.  Monetarist and 
structuralist explanations of inflation processes are distinguished in order to discuss the 
crucial determinants of stabilization success which in turn are a necessary prerequisite to 
better understand the subsequent disintegration of the ERBS programs.  
An account of the inflation problems in both periods has to start from the external 
shocks preceding these episodes in Germany and Latin America, WWI and the debt crisis, 
respectively.  The external imbalances Germany faced in the early 1920s are comparable, if 
not more severe, than in the aftermath of the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s.  
Under the London agreement of 1921 reparation payments amounted to ca. 80 percent of 
export revenues.  In comparison, Latin American countries had to transfer 30-50 percent of 
exports abroad in order to fulfill their debt payments in the mid-1980s (Webb, 1988).  In both 
instances high (Mexico) or hyperinflation (Argentina, Weimar) followed. 
The monetarist explanation identifies inflation as a purely monetary process.  In order 
to generate resources to service the debt or reparations (and support the passive Ruhr 
resistance in Germany) governments ran large budget deficits whose monetization raised the 
price level.  The success of ending hyperinflation or high inflation in Weimar Germany and 
Latin America is attributed to the removal of fiscal imbalances.  Hence, the strict imposition 
of fiscal and monetary discipline is the crucial ingredient for stabilization success (Sargent, 
1982; Cagan, 1956). 
The alternative to this monetarist interpretation emphasizes the social or structural 
factors causing inflation (Kindleberger, 1993; Taylor, 1991; Franco, 1986).  The additional 
external demand on the national product (debt or reparation payments) triggered internal 
distributional conflict over which groups will bear the brunt of the burden.  Discussing the 
German case, Franco (1986) convincingly points out that the after-war level of real wages 
was at only 60-70 percent of prewar levels in Germany and that there was consequently a  5 
great expectation of catch-up on the part of workers.  In fact, “the inconsistency between 
external balance and the goals of the labor movement was overwhelming; this problem was at 
the very root of the inflationary explosion” (Franco, 1986, p. 231).
2  
Similarly, Mexican as well as Argentine wages had fallen to half their pre-crisis levels 
in real terms in the mid-1980s.  According to the structuralist interpretation, inflation can be 
understood as the mechanism by which the additional burden on the economy is distributed to 
different income groups, the so-called inflation tax.  Sooner or later these groups—especially 
if they are backed by politically powerful organizations—will succeed in indexing their 
nominal incomes to the rate of inflation.  The exchange rate plays a crucial role in this 
scenario since its continuing devaluation feeds back into the wage-price inflation process, 
which eventually spirals out of control into hyperinflation. 
Explanations for the success of stopping inflation are necessarily based on the 
theoretical model of the causes of inflation.  The pegging of the exchange rate plays a crucial 
role in the structuralist stabilization scenario.  To end inflation in Germany, confidence in the 
new quasi-currency—the Rentenmark—had to be created by establishing and defending a 
stable exchange rate to the U.S. dollar until Germany rejoined the Gold Standard in August 
1924.  The elements of the stabilization programs are summarized in Table 1. 
The German stabilization proved to be rather fragile until the third quarter of 1924 
requiring very high interest rates during the first year after stabilization.  In spite of the credit 
crunch policy (“Kreditstop”), which was implemented in April of 1924 to confirm the 
Reichsbank’s credibility in maintaining a stable currency and in spite of a budget that had 
been in balance since December 1923 the German and foreign public continued to distrust the 
new currency.  The clearest indication of the continued fragility of the stabilization was the 
sharply upward-sloping term structure of interest rates signaling the continuous inflation 
worries of the German public.
3  It took the ratification of the Dawes plan to convince   6 
Table 1: A comparison of stabilization policy packages 
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Germans and potential foreign investors of the renewed stability of the Reichsmark.  
In this sense the Dawes Plan represented the official validation of the new currency by the 
international community.  Most importantly, the resolution of the reparation problem, if only 
temporarily, relaxed the external demands on the German economy thus easing the 
distributional struggle at the core of the inflation problem.  Economic austerity in  7 
combination with balanced budgets, as advocated by monetarists as the crucial ingredient for 
stabilization success, was not sufficient to guarantee the stability of the Rentenmark. 
In Latin America, the use of the exchange rate as the nominal anchor served the same 
purpose as rejoining the Gold Standard in the earlier period.  In both cases, the fiscal 
imbalances disappeared as soon as inflation slowed thus restoring government real revenue 
(Franco, 1986; Dornbusch, 1988).  Most importantly, in contrast to monetarist beliefs, the 
causality between fiscal deficits and inflation runs from the latter to the former.  It is the 
rescheduling and substantial cut of the foreign burden—reparation or debt—together with 
capital inflows under international agreements—Dawes or Brady plan—that finally regained 
the confidence of the international financial community and led to a resumption of substantial 
capital inflows into Latin America and Germany.   
Stabilization was successful because foreign capital inflows validated the nominal 
anchor function of the exchange rate and alleviated the underlying distributional conflict by 
allowing real wages to rise to socially acceptable levels.  This interpretation is supported by 
the fact that the Mexican stabilization, similar to the Weimar case, proved to be very fragile 
initially.  Only after the debt re-scheduling under the Brady plan lowered the external burden 
and led to a resumption of foreign capital inflows did stability return more permanently even 
though fiscal imbalances had been eliminated at the time of the implementation of the 
stabilization measures two years earlier.  Until then falling reserves confirm that the Mexican 
Central Bank had to constantly defend the exchange rate.  In Argentina, in contrast, the 
stabilization program was immediately followed by capital inflows and the steady 
accumulation of reserves after 1991.
4  8 
 
3. The aftermath of exchange-rate-based stabilization in Latin America 
The previous discussion has emphasized the role of capital inflows and international 
agreements in order to help countries stabilize their currencies by alleviating distributional 
struggles.  A number of economists have identified the conditions required to successfully 
combine inflation stabilization measures and foreign capital inflows in order to embark on a 
sustainable growth path.
5  Capital flows should be used for investment purposes and not to 
increase domestic consumption.  Moreover, foreign funds have to be channeled into the 
tradable goods sector in order to be able to create export revenue.  This implies a higher 
investment rate in the tradable compared to the non-tradable sector.  In the context of surges 
in capital flows due to capital account liberalization as in Latin America in the 1990s the 
policy dilemma is to attract sufficient inflows to restore growth without attracting too much 
capital which will appreciate the exchange rate.  Similarly, can interest rate spreads that 
foreign investors demand to account for higher country (inflation) risk be kept at levels that 
balance the promotion of growth and investment with the ability to repay the debt?
6   
In sum, there is a potential contradiction between inflation stabilization and open 
capital accounts.  In fact, a number of stylized facts that have been identified as consequences 
of ERBS programs in Latin America show that the sustainability conditions were not present 
after stabilization:
7 
(1) Currency appreciation: Fixing the exchange rate succeeds in bringing down inflation but 
domestic consumer prices do not converge instantly to the devaluation rate.  The ratio of 
consumer to producer prices rises.  Figure 1 shows that Mexico and Argentina both 
experienced an appreciation of the real exchange rate, i.e. product wages measured in 
units of tradable goods rise.  The result is a profit squeeze in the tradable sectors. 
  9 
(2) Boom-and-bust pattern: Stabilization is followed by a boom in the non-tradable sectors, 
which is largely fueled by consumption demand.  Output in the non-tradable sector tends 
to grow faster than tradable output, which stagnates relative to its previous trend (Rebelo 
and Vegh, 1995, p. 133).  These imbalances lead severe recession which might be 
accompanied by currency crises as in Mexico (1994) or Brazil (1999).  Or alternatively, 
the crisis is characterized by prolonged deflation as in Argentina where the currency board 
is still in place. 
(3) Current account deficits: In all cases the current account deteriorates rapidly, but is 
financed by foreign capital inflows attracted by high interest rates.  In fact, capital inflows 
more than compensate for the external deficits initially allowing central banks to 
accumulate reserves.  If growth does not resume and inflation worries resurface domestic 
and foreign investors expect a devaluation and start withdrawing deposits and other 
portfolio investments.  Hence, most program collapses are associated with both banking 
and currency crises.  This dynamic is present in Latin America even though the exact 
manifestations of the crises differ as indicated under (2).
 8  
 
To explain these patterns the structuralist literature has convincingly emphasized the 
contradictions between the simultaneous implementation of exchange-rate-based stabilization 
and open trade and capital accounts (Ros, 1996; Chisari, Fanelli and Frenkel, 1996; Blecker, 
1996).  While successful at stabilizing prices, this strategy has resulted in other types of 
distortions, in particular, an overvalued exchange rate.  In combination with import 
liberalization this has caused historically high current account deficits balanced by ample 
foreign capital inflows.  In the structuralist view full-scale liberalization of trade and capital 
account allow external imbalances to spiral out of control thereby ultimately undermining 
stabilization. In particular, liberal capital accounts expose recipient countries to the risk of  10 
capital flight. Social contracts, however, can play a decisive role in the long-term success of 
stabilization.  If distributional conflict is at the core of the inflation problem only a socially 
and politically acceptable sharing of the costs of stopping inflation can guarantee sustainable 
solutions.  But, using the exchange rate as a price anchor needs to be accompanied by a more 
careful integration into the world economy.  
According to this interpretation, the Latin American case represents the contradictions 
of the neo-liberal stabilization and growth strategy.  In particular, the stagnation of the 
tradable sector in combination with low domestic savings rates led to an unsustainable path of 
low growth and large current account deficits.  Eventually, domestic followed by foreign 
investors lost confidence in the sustainability of this strategy.  Consequently, both the 
Mexican as well as the Argentine economies suffered a severe crisis.  Mexico had to abandon 
its currency peg altogether after dramatic reserve losses following an attempted orderly 
devaluation in December of 1994.  Argentina maintained its currency board but suffered 
equally severe reserve losses and a dramatic decline in bank deposits of 18 percent between 
mid-1994 and March 1995.  Both countries required substantial U.S./IMF-led bail-outs 
without, however, preventing a severe recession with enormous social costs.  Alternatively, 
structuralists propose a less rapid, carefully guided opening of the capital and current account 
to complement inflation stabilization measures.  This would allow policy makers to fine-tune 
the macroeconomic incentive system, in particular avoiding a pronounced overvaluation of 
the exchange rate, in order to favor investment over consumption and production of tradable 
over non-tradable goods.  Keeping the fiscal spending in check to achieve macro balance and 
relying on the deregulation of trade and capital account to provide the “right” incentives does 
not guarantee a set of conditions conducive to growth. 
 
  11 
4. Stabilization and stagnation in Weimar Germany 
Economic developments in Weimar Germany show a remarkable resemblance to the 
Latin American stylized facts.  The immediate response after controlling inflation was an 
increase in aggregate demand especially consumption spending.  Foreign capital inflows, in 
particular from the United States, triggered by the Dawes loan were used to finance the 
ensuing current account deficits as well as reparation payments.  Is Borchardt’s previously 
mentioned claim of a profit squeeze in Weimar Germany due to the same set of factors that 
plagued Mexico and Argentina after inflation stabilization?  He had argued that investment 
rates were so low because real wage growth surpassed productivity gains in the 1920s.  The 
resulting profit squeeze depressed investment which in turn caused overall stagnation. 
There are two basic positions: The investigations following Borchardt’s lead find a 
strong negative effect of profit decline on investment (Borchardt and Ritschl, 1992).  In 
contrast, the Keynesian position identifies high real interest rates as the crucial obstacle to 
higher investment (Voth, 1995).  The former position repeats arguments already put forth by 
Weimar’s employer associations in the 1920s that blamed distributional conflict for low 
profits and economic stagnation.  The Keynesian argument points to a deflationary 
Reichsbank monetary policy, which kept interest rates artificially high thereby depressing 
investment.  Alternative to these two positions this paper interprets profit squeeze and high 
interest rates as structural problems that occur simultaneously as the result of the very success 
of the Rentenmark stabilization.  Neither lowering wages nor cutting interest rates were 
viable solutions to the problem of economic stagnation that plagued the Weimar economy in 
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4.1 Savings and investment 
The starting point is to find out whether ERBS programs are indeed characterized by 
stagnation relative to other comparable periods.  Table 2 shows that the periods following the 
ERBS programs are characterized by historically low savings and investment rates in 
combination with relatively high current account deficits and high private consumption rates.  
A comparison of the post-WWI period with the post-WWII period in Germany is especially 
revealing.  The “Wirtschaftswunder” economy could not only generate investment rates that 
were roughly six percent of GDP higher than during the Weimar years, it also succeeded in 
raising savings rates sufficiently to produce a trade surplus.  Profits in the business sector 
could be ensured because productivity growth surpassed real wage gains during this period.  
In contrast, the Weimar economy was characterized by a relatively high rate of consumption 
in combination with savings rates that were so low as to generate current account deficits in 
spite of historically low rates of investment.  The data in table 2 confirm that a comparison 
with the two Latin American economies produces similar results. 
 
Table 2: Stabilization and stagnation 
     Argentina      Mexico      Germany   
                   
Period    I  II III    I II  III    I II III 
   ERBS  Crisis  Growth   ERBS  Crisis Growth   ERBS  Growth Miracle 
Variable/ % of GDP    1991-95  1981-85  1976-80    1988-94  1981-85  1976-80    1925-28  1910-13  1950-54 
                    
Investment   17.8  20.5  25.5  22.1  23  24   11.9  15.2  17.6 
                    
Saving   15.3  18.5  25   17.5  27  21   10.4  16.6  20.8 
                    
Current  Account  -2.5  -2  -0.5  -4.6  4  -3   -1.5  1.4  3.2 
                    
Private  consumption  74 70 63    72  63  68    77.8  74.3  63.4 
                    
 
Sources:  Argentina: Fanelli & Frenkel (1996) and World Tables; Mexico: Ros (1996) and World Tables; Gemany: 
Hoffmann (1965) and Schmidt (1935). 
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Table 3: Saving and investment after ERBS (% of GDP) 
 
(a) Mexico        
 Saving Investment  S-I  Current  account 
 Public  Private*  Public  Private  Public**  Private***     
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI    VII 
              
1988 1.4  17.6  5.0 15.4 -3.6  2.2    -1.4 
1989 3.1  15.6  4.8 16.5 -1.7  -0.9    -2.6 
1990 6.7  12.5  4.9 17.0  1.8  -4.5    -2.7 
1991 7.5  10.3  4.6 17.8  2.9  -7.5    -4.6 
1992 7.1  9.5 4.2 19.1  2.9  -9.6    -6.7 
1993 6.3  8.9 4.2 17.8  2.1  -8.9    -6.8 
1994 5.0  10.7  4.5 19.1  0.5  -8.4    -7.9 
1995 5.3  12.2  4.6 17.5  0.7  -5.4    -4.7? 
              
(b) Argentina                
 Saving Investment  S-I  Current  account 
 Public  Private  Public  Private  Public  Private     
              
1986-90 -3.8 15.1  4.8  12.2  -8.6  2.9   -5.7 
              
1991 -1.8  15.6 2.2  12.4  -4.0  3.2    -0.8 
1992 0.0  13.5  1.9 14.8 -1.9  -1.3    -3.2 
1993 1.3  14.0  2.0 16.4 -0.7  -2.4    -3.1 
1994 0.2  15.9  1.7 18.3 -1.5  -2.4    -3.9 
1995 0.4  16.0  1.7 16.7 -1.3  -0.7    -2.0 
              
(c) Germany                
 Saving Investment  S-I  Current  account 
 Public  Private  Public  Private  Public  Private     
              
1925 2.8  9.2 2.6 13.7  0.2  -4.5    -4.3 
1926 3.1  11.3  3.1 11.4  0.0  -0.1    -0.1 
1927 4.8  8.4 3.2 15.1  1.6  -6.7    -5.1 
1928 4.0  9.3 3.0 13.9  1.0  -4.6    -3.6 
1929 3.1  8.6 3.0 11.4  0.0  -2.8    -2.8 
1930 3.8  5.8 2.6  7.8  1.2  -2.0    -0.7 
1931 2.1  3.5 2.1  1.9  -0.1  1.6    1.5 
1932 1.3  3.5 2.0  2.3  -0.7  1.2    0.5 
 
*Private savings equal private investment plus the private savings balance: II=VI+IV. 
** The public savings balance equals public savings minus public investments: V=I-III. 
*** The private savings balance equals the current account balance minus the public savings balance: VI=VII-V. 
Sources: see Table 2 
 
Table 3 takes a closer look at the savings-investment relationship during the periods 
of stagnation in the three countries.  The crucial point here is the widening of private sector 
deficits in all three cases, i.e. the private sector invests more than it saves thus generating  14 
current account deficits.  The problem in the aftermath of stabilization programs is thus not 
high investment but a falling savings propensity.  This constellation is especially clear in 
Mexico where private sector deficits reached almost double-digit figures relative to GDP in 
the early 1990s.  The public sector, in contrast, contributed savings of between 2-3 percent of 
GDP during the same period, and only the severe crisis of 1994-5 forced down private sector 
deficits. 
Argentina while having public as well as private deficits succeeded in lowering her 
public deficit during the 5 years following the ERBS program.  Weimar Germany similar to 
Mexico generated public sector surpluses, which were, however, insufficient to balance out 
private deficits resulting in substantial current account deficits in the period between 1924 to 
1929.  Only the onset of severe deflation and depression eventually reversed this pattern and 
led to current account surpluses.  This fact contradicts monetarist positions that point to 
irresponsible government spending patterns as the culprit behind the eventual collapse of 
inflation stabilization programs.
9   
The financing pattern of investment in Germany helps to illustrate further this macro 
relationship.  Looking at the sources of investment spending in the 1920s, one of the striking 
developments in the post-inflation period is the very low contribution of retained earnings 
(i.e. savings out of profit) to total net capital formation.  Based on data provided by Keese 
(1967, p. 51), retained earnings contributed only 9 percent to investment between 1925 and 
1929.  According to his data, both public savings with a 41 percent share and foreign savings 
(36 percent) largely financed investment during this period.  Thus, foreign savings 
contributed more to domestic investment than retained earnings and household savings 
combined.   
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4.2 Investment and the profit squeeze 
Why was the private sector unable to produce more savings that would have generated 
a more sustainable external balance?  The answer is that Weimar Germany was also affected 
by a profit squeeze in the tradable sector which contributed to investment stagnation and high 
current account deficits.  As in Latin America recently, the exchange rate anchor proved to be 
an effective tool in stopping inflation in traded goods but prices of non-traded goods took 
longer to adjust (Figure 1c).  Nominal wages are usually indexed to the consumer price index, 
which largely consists of non-traded goods and services.  The pattern of price divergence is 
similar to the Latin American case.  The data show that starting in 1924 consumer prices (as a 
proxy for non-tradables) rose faster than wholesale prices (as a proxy for tradable goods).  In 
fact, the WPI remained almost constant between inflation stabilization and the middle of 1929 
after which there is a strong deflationary trend for both sets of prices.  Consumer price 
inflation is steady during the same period with strong increases between early 1924 to mid-
1925 (Institut für Konjunkturforschung, 1936). 
  The crucial point in Borchardt’s argument is that real wages were rising faster than 
productivity in the aftermath of inflation stabilization.  The wage share, which normally 
moves countercyclically in German history (Block, 1999), actually increased during the short 
boom of 1926-28.  To Borchardt this signified the “sickness” of the Weimar economy 
(Borchardt, 1989, pp. 141-2).  His conclusions were challenged on empirical grounds by 
Holtfrerich (1984) who argued that Borchardt underestimates productivity advances because 
he compares output per worker with hourly wages although the average work week declined 
during this period.  Holtfrerich’s corrected data—using a CPI deflator—showed that unit 
labor costs remained relatively stable during the 1920s compared to a pre-WWI benchmark.
10 
  The data also show, however, that this discussion neglects a more important issue 
mentioned above: the divergence of price deflators until 1929.  Table 4 compares different  16 
estimates of unit labor costs using three price deflators using annual data on output and wages 
thereby avoiding the empirical problems raised by Holtfrerich.  All of the estimates confirm 
Borchardt’s initial suggestion that real wages did indeed rise faster than productivity but 
significant differences result from the application of alternative price deflators.  Unit labor 
costs based on consumer prices rise only marginally between 1925 and 1929.  To lower 
consumer wages even further would have been unacceptable to Weimar unions and could 
have destabilized the young and fragile democracy. 
 
Table 4: Indices of Industrial Unit Labor Costs in Weimar Germany, 1925-1938 
 
  Based on annual earnings    Based on labor cost 
 CPI  WPI  PIF    CPI WPI  PIF 
1925  100 100 100    100  100  100 
1926  100.9  108.7  105.8  96.7  104.2  101.4 
1927  97.1  104.2  107.7  94.6  101.6  104.9 
1928 105  114.8  111    102.5  112.2 108.4 
1929 104.8  120.7  113.2    101.8  117.1  109.9 
1930 108.4  137.8  117.9    112.6  143.1  122.5 
1931 111  150.7  122.3    117.4  159.5 129.4 
1932 102.9  141.8  116.6    110.8  152.7  125.5 
1933 96.2  135.6  111.1    104.5  147.2 120.6 
1934  97.7  133  112.6  99.7  135.8  115 
1935 91.4  119.6  103.9    92  120.4 104.6 
1936 90.2  115.3  103.4    89  113.7  102 
1937  89.3  113.8  103.2  87.6  111.6  101.3 
1938 88.9  115.4  103.2    86  111.6  99.8 
 
Notes: Indices are calculated with the following formula using annual data:  
(earnings or labor costs*employment)/(price index*production);  
CPI=consumer price index, WPI=wholesale price index, PIF=index of industrial finished goods prices. 
Source: Corbett (1991, p. 44 and Appendix A) 
 
In contrast, product wages show a substantial increase using both the wholesale price 
index and the index of industrial finished goods prices.
11  This is another way of looking at 
the profit squeeze afflicting the tradable sectors of the German economy.
12  It also closely 
resembles the aftermath of ERBS programs in Mexico and especially Argentina.  Hence, in 
all three cases tradable prices quickly adjusted to international prices.  In contrast, non- 17 
tradable prices that by definition were not exposed to international competition rose more 
quickly than in the main trading partners.
13  
One way of substantiating the claim of a squeeze in the tradable sector is to compare 
investment rates to find out whether there is stagnation in tradable vis-à-vis non-tradable 
investment in Weimar Germany.  Figure 2 plots the ratio of tradable to non-tradable 
investment for the period 1924-1929.  Tradable investment is defined as the sum of industrial 
and agricultural sector investment; non-tradable sectors include utilities, transport, 
construction, public administration plus wholesale and retail trade. The generally dismal 
investment performance in the years following currency stabilization was mentioned earlier 
but figure 2 adds the dimension of a relative decline of vital tradable investment during the 
1920s.  There is a short recovery of tradable investment in the boom of 1927-8 but a sharp 
drop thereafter. 
So far the analysis lacks a confirmation of the claim that low profit rates do indeed 
affect investment.  After all, in a world of perfect capital markets the ability of firms to 
generate investment funds internally should not limit investment spending since they can 
always access external funds.  Underlying Borchardt’s arguments is the implicit assumption 
that interwar German capital markets did not conform to the model of perfect capital 
markets.
14  One way of investigating whether low profits affected investment is to look at 
sectoral data available for a number of industries.  For that purpose profit data taken from 
Maxine Sweezy (1939/40) are matched with sectoral equipment investment data from official 
German sources for 15 different industries for the period 1926-38.
15  Figure 3 relates profit to 
investment rates for the whole period and the years 1926-1930 respectively.  For both periods 
a strong positive correlation between profits and investment activity can be identified.
16  The 
evidence suggests that the wage squeeze on profits did indeed affect investment through the 
retained earnings channel.  It is precisely the inability of the business sector to generate  18 
internal funds for investment that explains the low savings rates characteristic of Weimar 
Germany in the period 1925-1930.
17 
The level of profits relative to alternative returns represented by the interest rate gives 
us another indication of why investment in capacity was low during this period.  Real returns 
on capital during the 1920s were never much above the return on government bonds.  Risky 
investments in capacity were hardly justified by the meager spread.  Thus, incentives for 
private capital formation are weak if large capital gains can be made in the stock market 
and/or high interest rates prevail in the bond market.  In addition, high interest rates also 
imply a cost squeeze on cash flow of firms adding to the profit-squeeze effect of high real 
wages.   
 
4.3 Reichsbank dilemmas 
It could still be argued that an expansionary Reichsbank policy of low interest rates 
could have avoided the stagnation of investment.  The main problem here is that the monetary 
authorities face a dilemma when simultaneously trying to control aggregate demand and thus 
inflationary pressures through interest rate policy as well as generating a real exchange rate 
that will ensure the competitiveness of the tradable goods sector.  A high interest rate policy 
will, on the one hand, achieve the objective of curbing inflation by sterilizing the monetary 
effects of accumulating reserves.  On the other hand, if the interest differential to abroad is 
sufficient to attract capital inflows over and above current account financing needs there will 
be a continuous pressure toward real exchange rate appreciation thereby sacrificing the much 
needed competitiveness of the tradable sector.  In contrast, a low interest rate policy inducing 
higher aggregate demand will inevitably exert pressure on prices and lead to real exchange 
rate appreciation that way.  It should also be kept in mind that the restrictive Reichsbank Law 
of 1925 required the Reichsbank to hold gold or currency reserves in the amount of 40  19 
percent of the money supply.  An expansionary policy based on domestic credit creation as in 
1927 thus had immediately binding legal constraints in much the same way as in Argentina’s 
currency board arrangement today. 
The situation in Germany in the first half of 1927 gives an illustration of this policy 
dilemma.  Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht warned early on against the impotence of 
the Reichsbank to control the money supply in the presence of massive capital inflows 
(Schacht, 1927).  The Advisory Board for Foreign Credit, which was founded in 1925 to 
control capital inflows had very limited influence on public borrowing and no control over 
private borrowing (McNeil, 1986, pp. 65-67).  To curb inflows and regain control over the 
domestic money market it was agreed in late 1926 to abandon tax advantages to foreign 
purchasers of German bonds, which were vital for the ability to borrow in New York at the 
time.  Consequently, long-term lending to Germany virtually stopped for a period of six 
months.  The strategy was complemented in early 1927 by the Reichsbank’s lowering of the 
discount rate to 5 percent, the legal limit set by the victors in the 1924 Reichsbank Law.  But 
the domestic capital markets quickly showed first signs of overexposure when the Reich 
government tried to float a 500 billion Reichsmark bond issue in February, the first since the 
stabilization.  The loan proved too large to be absorbed by the still shallow market.  The 
public was understandably reluctant to hold bonds because the inflation in combination with 
the 1925 Revaluation Law had resulted in the almost complete expropriation of their previous 
bond holdings. 
In spite of low discount rates short-term interest rates in the money market started to 
rise causing short-term foreign capital to return in unprecedented volume in March and April.  
McNeil (1986, pp. 147-8) reports that within two and a half months foreigners sent 800 
million Reichsmark to Germany.  Harris (1935, p.7) notes a jump in foreign short-term capital 
from 100 million in 1926 to 1,800 million in the boom year of 1927.  This money was in part  20 
directed into the Berlin stock exchange which saw its index soaring in the first four months of 
the year.  Funds were channeled to the stock market by the large Berlin banks extending their 
credit lines with American banks in order to re-lend the money for a sizable profit to German 
stock market speculators.  Or alternatively, foreigners invested directly in German stocks. 
At the same time several indicators showed a marked rise in prices from the trough in 
mid-1926.  The domestic boom also led to sizable monthly current account deficits of 200-
400 million Reichsmark adding up to over 4 billion for the year (Institut für 
Konjunkturforschung, 1936, p. 90).  Since foreign capital inflows were not sufficient to cover 
the deficits on the current account the Reichsbank started losing 500 million Reichsmark in 
reserves between January and June 1927 amounting to 21 percent of total reserves. 
Schacht realized in the spring of 1927 that his attempt to manage foreign capital 
inflows and regain control over the money supply had failed.  Banks, in particular the Berlin 
commercial banks, could easily circumvent the crippled foreign bond market (due to the 
abolition of the tax advantages) and draw on their short-term credit with foreign banks.  Even 
worse, this meant an increasing short-term nature of foreign liabilities in the banks’ balance 
sheets increasing the banking system’s fragility.  The whole bill came due in 1930 when 
political uncertainty increased country risk after the Nazi success in the September elections 
and wholesale capital flight ensued (Block, 2000b).   
The above episode shows the difficulty of controlling money markets in the aftermath 
of hyperinflation without upsetting shallow capital markets, which continue to be dependent 
on foreign capital.  A low interest rate policy thus has a twofold problem.  On the one hand, 
booming demand leads to rising prices and an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  The 
boom is accompanied by current account deficits, which will eat into reserves if foreign 
capital is not forthcoming (also remember the above mentioned legal reserve requirements  21 
imposed in the Reichsbank Law).  On the other hand, German capital markets were still 
unable to provide the long-term finance for public or private investment spending. 
This episode shows that the high growth rate of 1927 was not sustainable.  The 
financial market was unable to sustain the expansion without the infusion of increasingly 
short-term capital inflows and interest rates quickly edged up from their post-stabilization 
lows.  In addition, inflation quickly accelerated and the current account deficit rose to over 4 
percent of GDP.  This episode casts doubt on the claim put forth by some of Borchardt’s 
critiques (Holtfrerich, 1984; Voth, 1995) that a more expansionary monetary policy would 
have been a sustainable solution to the problem of stagnating investment.  It is difficult to 
imagine that the Reichsbank could have succeeded in pursuing a monetary policy that would 
have balanced internal constraints of shallow capital markets and inflation fears with 
maintaining a sustainable current account deficit. 
 
5.  Present and Past: What are the lessons?  
The crisis and economic collapse of the Weimar Republic has continued to generate 
controversy over the last 60 years.  Historical events as well as new developments in 
economic theory have frequently shed new light on the debate.  The objective of this paper 
was to respond to the ongoing Borchardt debate by learning lessons from the recent 
experience of some Latin American countries.  Borchardt’s profit squeeze hypothesis was re-
interpreted as a result of the very success of inflation-stopping exchange-rate-based 
stabilization programs.  The real appreciation of the currency causes a profit squeeze in the 
tradables sector of the economy thereby causing stagnation, low savings rates and large 
current account deficits.  It is in this sense that ERBS programs “sow the seeds of their own 
destruction.”  22 
  In concluding this paper will use the arguments outlined above to take a closer look 
at the policy options in the early 1930s as well as provide an evaluation of the current Latin 
American situation.  Borchardt had argued that deflationary policies were the only option left 
for Reichskanzler Brüning.  Instead, his Keynesian opponents saw a promising alternative in 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies accompanied by a withdrawal from the Gold 
Standard.  The latter conclusion is indirectly corroborated by evidence that countries 
abandoning gold parity relatively early, like England, suffered from milder real losses during 
the depression compared to countries that stayed on gold.  Britain’s economic recovery after 
withdrawing from the EMS in 1992 and the revival of the Mexican and Brazilian economies 
after their devaluations in 1994 and 1999 seem to support the devaluation option.  In contrast, 
Argentina is still mired in depression.  Although Mexico went through a severe recession in 
1995 it recovered surprisingly quickly from this setback.  At the end of the 1990s Mexico’s 
macroeconomic framework appears to be based on solid foundations.  The domestic savings 
rate is now at just over 20 percent of GDP roughly 5 percent higher than during the crisis 
year.  Foreign savings currently only contribute 3-4 percent of GDP compared to almost 8 
percent in 1994.   
However, a closer look at the recent Mexican success after ending its currency peg 
casts some doubt on the feasibility of this option for Germany.  There are a number of factors 
that help to explain Mexico’s swift recovery after the dramatic collapse.  First and foremost, 
the sharp devaluation improved profitability in the tradable sector and sharply increased the 
competitiveness of Mexican goods.  From a structuralist perspective it is this improved 
profitability that largely explains the markedly improved domestic savings rate.  But there are 
other conjectural factors external to the Mexican economy that were instrumental in 
cushioning the extent and impact of the crisis.  The rapidly U.S./IMF-administered rescue 
package successfully prevented a financial panic from turning into a long-term financial  23 
meltdown in the aftermath of the 1980s debt crisis.  Injections of foreign currency were 
needed because a sizable portion of foreign debt was denominated in dollars, like the 
infamous tesobonos.  Secondly, the United States absorbed booming Mexican exports fueling 
an export-led recovery.  Since 1994, roughly 80 percent of Mexican exports went to the 
United States.  Consequently, the U.S. trade balance with Mexico quickly turned from a small 
surplus in 1994 to a $15 billion deficit within a year.  Mexico benefited from the NAFTA 
agreement as well as the long U.S. economic boom in the 1990s.  Furthermore, foreign 
interest rates remained low and capital returned soon after the situation stabilized.  This is not 
to say that the financial turmoil after the Asian, Russian and Brazilian didn’t affect Mexico’s 
external borrowing.  But Mexico was in a much stronger position than in 1994 including a 
higher level of reserves, lower public sector debt payments and a higher share of foreign 
direct investment relative to portfolio investment to pay for current account deficits. 
Unfortunately, none of these beneficial circumstances could be observed during the 
early 1930s.  First, during the interwar period U.S. trade policy grew increasingly 
protectionist.  Secondly, real interest rates in the United States remained very high during the 
depression and the following years and international lending was at a standstill.  Thirdly, 
there was little international cooperation beyond the Hoover Moratorium to help Germany 
inject liquidity into its collapsing financial system.   
Argentina’s predicament is similar to the Weimar case in particular because the 
currency board, which pegs the peso at a 1:1 exchange rate with the U.S. dollar is still in 
place despite the apparent contradictions.  But this relative stability was only achieved 
through continuous injections of IMF-administered foreign loans and debt re-scheduling 
programs especially after the frequent emerging market financial crises during the 1990s.  In 
addition, currency stability comes at the cost of ongoing economic stagnation.  Currently, the 
Argentine economy is suffering from a prolonged recession with high unemployment and  24 
widespread de-industrialization.  Based on this analysis the main problem lies in the fact that 
the Peso continues to be overvalued aggravated in recent years by the dollar appreciation and 
the devaluation of Argentina’s main trading partner, Brazil.  In addition, the foreign debt has 
ballooned to roughly 130 billion dollars.  This precarious situation has most recently led to 
interest rate spreads on U.S. treasury bills of 10 percent.  The implied high real interest rates 
will make it close to impossible for the Argentine government to control its debt level even 
though it has embarked on an ambitious program of fiscal spending cuts in 2001.  Similarly, 
at these interest rates private investment activity will likely remain depressed.  Furthermore, 
reductions in fiscal spending will only worsen the current depression much in the same way 
as the austerity measures implemented by the Brüning government did in the early 1930s. 
This discussion suggests that decision makers should focus on the conditions for 
renewed growth instead of trying to eliminate fiscal deficits.  A continuation of strict fiscal 
austerity à la Brüning will only cause further stagnation and economic crisis.  Promoting 
growth is only possible by returning profitability to private sector activity through devaluation 
as in Mexico.  But Argentina is not as closely integrated with the United States and its export 
sector is much smaller in comparison.  Argentina’s debt is to over 90 percent denominated in 
dollars so that devaluation will have a disastrous effect on the financial system.  In July 2001 
in anticipation of a default deposits are already withdrawn from the banking system at a rate 
similar to the aftermath of the Peso crisis.  Furthermore, even though the IMF is still pouring 
in money to bolster the economy, the current U.S. administration is less likely to take an 
active stance to assist Argentina in case of a default as the Clinton administration did in 
association with the IMF during the Peso crisis. 
The key lesson from the historical episodes is that inflation-stopping ERBS programs 
create other internal and external structural imbalances that require careful policy choices to 
avoid potentially disastrous economic collapses.  A policy of rigid currency boards, fiscal  25 
austerity and openness is not capable of returning economic prosperity.  Exchange rate 
adjustments however need to be accompanied by international cooperation in finance and 
trade.   While Mexico encountered a set of conditions conducive to renewed growth after a 
painful adjustment period, these conditions were not present in the interwar period and 





                                                            
1 Since Hitler’s takeover of power in 1933 is usually attributed to the impact of high 
unemployment and other economic dislocations caused by the Depression it is implicit in this 
argument that such a policy response could have prevented the following nightmare of 
fascism and war.  This association is the reason behind the controversy and intensity 
associated with the Borchardt debate.  These political repercussions will, however, not be 
pursued in this paper. 
2 Borchardt (1991, ch. 10) seems to lean towards this structuralist inflation story.  He writes 
that “[U]ndoubtedly it was the considerable imports of capital which prevented many a 
conflict over distribution from manifesting itself so clearly in Germany; otherwise these 
conflicts would have emerged earlier.” 
3  Even though price levels could be stabilized, inflation worries continued to characterize 
German capital markets throughout the 1920s and even during the deflationary period in the 
early 1930s (Borchardt, 1991). 
4  A number of figures illustrating the behavior of reserves and several macroeconomic 
variables have been omitted from this paper due to space constraints.   They are collected in 
an unpublished appendix available upon request.  For a more comprehensive presentation see 
also Block (2000a).  
5  See, for example, Blecker (1996), Dornbusch and Werner (1994), Chisari, Fanelli and 
Frenkel (1996). 
6  The current (July 2001) situation in Argentina, for example, is unbalanced.  International 
investors demand interest spreads of more than 10 percent implying a real rate of interest of 
roughly 13-14 percent.  At these rates the objective of jumpstarting the slumping economy to 
lower unemployment and stabilize debt levels will unlikely be achieved. 
7 There exists now a vast literature on the empirical regularities following exchange-rate-
based stabilization programs.  See, for example, Calvo and Vegh (1998), Rebelo and Vegh 
(1995), and Kiguel and Liviatan (1992).  The Argentine plan is discussed in Fanelli and 
Frenkel (1998).  Mexico’s inflation stabilization is the subject of Dornbusch and Werner 
(1994), Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), and Lustig and Ros (1998).  A detailed 
graphical representation of these stylized facts collected in an unpublished appendix is 
available upon request.  26 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
8  Brazil also experienced real currency appreciation after the implementation of the Real plan 
in 1994.  As in Mexico and Argentina the ERBS plan was successful in stopping 
hyperinflation but led to large current account deficits.  Brazil’s case is somewhat different 
because the government in response to the Peso crisis pursued a policy of extremely high 
interest rates which destabilized the banking system.  Fiscal deficits quickly ensued because 
of government bail-outs of fragile banks.  Palma (2000) provides a structuralist interpretation 
of the Brazilian experience with the Real plan.  In January of 1999 Brazil had to abandon its 
currency peg in the aftermath of the Russian default and suffered a deep economic crisis.  
However, the economy has recovered quickly from the crisis because (i) the devaluation made 
Brazilian products competitive and (ii) inflation could be kept in check.  However, the 
country now has to cope with a volatile exchange rate and still receives substantial help from 
the IMF in 2001.  A detailed analysis of the Brazilian case is beyond the scope of this paper.   
9  Similarly, the policy discussion on Argentina’s current options to escape stagnation and a 
possible default center entirely around the question of keeping fiscal expenditure in check.  
The problem however is that the extremely high real interest rates that the Argentine state has 
to pay make it very difficult to stabilize foreign debt levels even though the government has 
been running a primary surplus for some time.  This discussion begs the question of how to 
propel the economy out of stagnation in the presence of the currency board since the 
structuralist interpretation suggests that stagnation is mainly the result of currency 
overvaluation. 
10 Ritschl (1990), Corbett (1991) and Borchardt (1989) present summaries of the 
computational issues raised in the controversy.  Holtfrerich’s criticism seems less relevant if 
one takes into account that the reductions in the work week were implemented for the most 
part immediately after the 1918 November revolution and not during the second half of the 
1920s.  I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
11 Corbett (1991) further disaggregates unit labor costs for a number of industries and while 
finding a considerable amount of cross-industry variation confirms the overall rise. 
12  An alternative profit squeeze argument was put forth by German economist Adolph Lowe 
in the contemporary debates (see Hagemann, 1984).  He argued that monopolies in particular 
in basic industries, like coal, kept prices artificially high and depressed profits in upstream 
industries.  Instead of wage cuts he therefore recommended to expose these industries to the 
discipline of free trade or “Erziehungsfreihandel.”  Trade policy to discipline monopolies as 
an element of an industrial policy is certainly compatible with the structuralist interpretation 
put forth in this paper.  But a general free trade policy in the presence of an overvalued 
exchange rate and liquid international financial markets is likely to lead to unsustainable 
current account deficits.  The data also show that wholesale prices quickly stabilized after the 
Rentenmark reform and remained stable until deflation set in.   It may be interesting to 
investigate monopoly prices in retail or real estate since prices in these sectors rose in the 
second half of the 1920s in Weimar Germany. 
13  Hentschel (1986) has computed indices of real effective exchange rates (REER) that allow 
us to further investigate Germany’s loss of competitiveness.  His data clearly show that 
Germany quickly lost its competitive edge after stabilization compared to France and the 
United States whose real exchange rates were indeed falling during the 1920s.  In contrast, 
the competitive position of the United Kingdom was irreversibly damaged after WWI and its 
return to the Gold Standard in 1925 at prewar parity. 
14 It is now a well-established stylized fact that a firm’s cash flow influences its investment 
activity.  Bernanke and Gertler (1995) provide a survey of the evidence.   27 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
15 These computations are similar to Corbett (1991) who identifies 16 different industries to 
correlate profit rates with investment spending. 
16 Correlation coefficients for the profit-investment relationship for the 15 sectors were also 
computed.   While there is evidence of sectoral variation average coefficients for the whole 
period and different sub-periods are between .55 and .65 supporting the positive relationship 
shown in figure 3. 
17  The lack of investment activity is also the main reason for high and rising levels of 
unemployment in the structuralist interpretation proposed here.  Rather than focus on capacity 
constraints as the contemporary capital shortage argument (see Hagemann, 1984, p. 109) does 
structuralists emphasize the underutilization of capacity, i.e. a lack of effective demand as the 
main cause of unemployment in a short-run framework.  In addition, the capital shortage 
argument seems to argue that investment in the Weimar Republic was constrained by the 
inability of the domestic capital markets to generate the necessary savings due to the 
destruction of money wealth after hyperinflation and due to the crowding-out effect of public 
borrowing needs.  In contrast, a structuralist interpretation locates the problem of stagnation 
and unemployment in the inability of the business sector to generate profits sufficient to fund 
future investment as well as provide the incentive to undertake such investments.  
 28 
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Figure 1: The relative price of non-tradable goods after ERBS (CPI/W PI)
Notes: A consumer price index (CPI) is used as a proxy for non-tradable goods prices
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Figure 2: The ratio of tradable to non-tradable investment in Germany
Notes: Tradable sectors include industry and agriculture.  Investment in the construction sector 
was subtracted from industrial investment based on disaggregated investment data for the
industrial sector.  Non-tradable investment incorporates all other sectors (utilities, transport,
residential construction, public administration and others.  “Other investment” was included
because it largely measures investment in services like retail and wholesale trade.
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Figure 3: Investment and profitability in Weimar Germany
Notes: Profit and investment data include 15 industries: mining, iron and metal extraction, chemicals, paper, 
building trades and materials, rubber and asbestos, leather, electrical, machinery and apparatus, textiles, 
clothing, foodstuffs, musical instruments, iron& steel&metal manufacturing and paper finishing.
Source: Profit data from Sweezy (1934-5); investment data from Statistisches Jahrbuch für das 


























































tMERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series 
- 2001- 
 
2001-001  The Changing Nature of Pharmaceutical R&D - Opportunities for Asia? 
Jörg C. Mahlich and Thomas Roediger-Schluga 
 
2001-002  The Stringency of Environmental Regulation and the 'Porter Hypothesis' 
Thomas Roediger-Schluga 
 
2001-003  Tragedy of the Public Knowledge 'Commons'? Global Science, Intellectual 
Property and the Digital Technology Boomerang 
Paul A. David 
 
2001-004  Digital Technologies, Research Collaborations and the Extension of Protection 
for Intellectual Property in Science: Will Building 'Good Fences' Really Make 
'Good Neighbors'? 
  Paul  A.  David 
 
2001-005  Expert Systems: Aspects of and Limitations to the Codifiability of Knowledge 
  Robin  Cowan 
 
2001-006  Monopolistic Competition and Search Unemployment: A Pissarides-Dixit-  
Stiglitz model 
  Thomas  Ziesemer 
 
2001-007  Random walks and non-linear paths in macroeconomic time series: Some 
evidence and implications 
    Franco Bevilacqua and Adriaan van Zon 
 
2001-008  Waves and Cycles: Explorations in the Pure Theory of Price for Fine Art 
  Robin  Cowan 
 
2001-009  Is the World Flat or Round? Mapping Changes in the Taste for Art 
  Peter  Swann 
 
2001-010  The Eclectic Paradigm in the Global Economy 
    John Cantwell and Rajneesh Narula 
 
2001-011  R&D Collaboration by 'Stand-alone' SMEs: opportunities and limitations in the 
ICT sector 
  Rajneesh  Narula 
 
2001-012  R&D Collaboration by SMEs: new opportunities and limitations in the face of 
globalisation 
  Rajneesh  Narula 
 
2001-013  Mind the Gap - Building Profitable Community Based Businesses on the 
Internet 
    Bernhard L. Krieger and Philipp S. Müller 
 
2001-014  The Technological Bias in the Establishment of a Technological Regime: the 
adoption and enforcement of early information processing technologies in US 
manufacturing, 1870-1930 
    Andreas Reinstaller and Werner Hölzl 
 
2001-015  Retrieval of Service Descriptions using Structured Service Models 
    Rudolf Müller and Stefan Müller  
2001-016  Auctions - the Big Winner Among Trading Mechanisms for the Internet 
Economy 
  Rudolf  Müller 
 
2001-017  Design and Evaluation of an Economic Experiment via the Internet 
    Vital Anderhub, Rudolf Müller and Carsten Schmidt 
 
2001-018  What happens when agent T gets a computer? 
    Lex Borghans and Bas ter Weel 
 
2001-019  Manager to go? Performance dips reconsidered with evidence from Dutch 
football 
    Allard Bruinshoofd and Bas ter Weel 
 
2001-020  Computers, Skills and Wages 
    Lex Borghans and Bas ter Weel 
 
2001-021  Knowledge Transfer and the Services Sector in the Context of the New Economy 
    Robin Cowan, Luc Soete and Oxana Tchervonnaya 
 
2001-022  Stickiness of Commercial Virtual Communities 
    Rita Walczuch, Marcel  Verkuijlen, Bas Geus, Ursela Ronnen 
 
2001-023  Automatic ontology mapping for agent communication 
    F. Wiesman, N. Roos and P. Vogt 
 
2001-024  Multi Agent Diagnosis: an analysis 
    N. Roos, A. ten Teije, A. Bos and C. Witteveen 
 
2001-025  ICT as Technical Change in the Matching and Production Functions of a 
Pissarides-Dixit-Stiglitz model 
  Thomas  Ziesemer 
 
2001-026  Economic stagnation in Weimar Germany: A structuralist perspective 












Papers can be purchased at a cost of NLG 15,- or US$ 9,- per report at the following address: 
 
MERIT – P.O. Box 616 – 6200 MD Maastricht – The Netherlands – Fax : +31-43-3884905 
(* Surcharge of NLG 15,- or US$ 9,- for banking costs will be added for order from abroad) 
 
Subscription: the yearly rate for MERIT-Infonomics Research Memoranda is NLG 300 or 
US$ 170, or papers can be downloaded from the internet: 
 
http://meritbbs.unimaas.nl 
http://www.infonomics.nl 
email: secr-merit@merit.unimaas.nl 
 